Commonwealth of Calamity: Hurricane Santa Clara and the Cold War Politics of Disaster in Puerto Rico

Ian Seavey, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

Hurricane Santa Clara battered Puerto Rico in 1956 and inflicted over $40 million in property destruction, claimed thirteen lives, and just $7 million was appropriated for relief efforts. This hurricane also tested the autonomy achieved through the Estado Libre Asociado (ELA) or Commonwealth Status in 1952. This status change, initially heralded as the end of colonialism in Puerto Rico, allowed the archipelago to elect its own governor, have more autonomy over local politics, and more closely manage disaster relief efforts. However, this essay argues that in the aftermath of Hurricane Santa Clara U.S. colonial administrators demonstrated that the U.S. federal government still controlled the economic purse for disaster relief, viewed Puerto Rico under the umbrella of American paternalism, and these factors to reinforce colonial status. For U.S. policymakers, the desire to see its most important possession in the Caribbean rebound from this disastrous hurricane constituted a legitimate security problem that superseded Puerto Rican concerns about autonomy. A dedication to making the Caribbean safe for democracy directly involved Puerto Rico as both U.S. and Puerto Rican policymakers viewed the archipelago as the bulwark of development against communism in Latin America. Three interlocking factors shaped U.S. policymaker’s rationale for overseeing relief efforts: a newly established disaster relief apparatus enacted by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Cold War strategic thinking, and the ingrained idea that the U.S. still had a paternal obligation to Puerto Rico.

No extended abstract or paper available

 Presented in Session 191. Beyond the Iron Curtain: Reassessing the Cold War's Global Impact