A Pragmatist Theory of Dilemmas

Muhammad Amasha, Yale University

Sociological theories of action have long illuminated the dynamics behind human action, yet dilemmas, a ubiquitous phenomenon related to action, remain underexplored. Although dilemmas sporadically surface in sociological discourse, they lack robust theorization within the discipline. Predominantly, dilemmas are addressed within the rational choice tradition, which tends to conceptualize them in a generic and objectivist manner. This could be exemplified by its assumption that any situation where some benefit from public good without paying for it would inevitably pose a free-rider dilemma for those paying for the public good. The theory cannot explain why some people in this situation may not face a dilemma. That is because it neglects habits and the constitutive role of situations. This article, rooted in the pragmatist theory of action, seeks to introduce an alternative actor- and situation-specific theory of dilemmas. Firstly, I propose a typology of dilemmas categorized into three types: competing-interests dilemmas, interest-value dilemmas, and moral/competing-values dilemmas. Secondly, I explain why we face dilemmas: I argue that dilemmas arise when individuals encounter situations that trigger divergent habitual responses, each urging a different course of action. By examining these dynamics, this research aims to bridge the gap in sociological literature and offer a nuanced understanding of dilemmas in the context of action.

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 Presented in Session 77. System and Action