Bureaucratization as a Bumpy Journey: The Rise and Fall of Imperial Chinese State

Shuyi Yu, University of Chicago

Historians have long documented the rise and fall of the Imperial Chinese state. This paper introduces bureaucratization as a potential mechanism underlying these dynamics. It develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the inherent principal-agent problem in state administration, identifying two types of agents available to the ruler: elites and bureaucrats. The process of bureaucratization, driven by exogenous forces such as technological advancements and power centralization, enabled the state to routinize an increasing portion of administrative tasks and delegate them to bureaucrats rather than elites. A contract with bureaucrats offers higher returns than one with elites, as bureaucrats can be more effectively monitored. Interestingly, as bureaucrats gradually took on administrative duties, state capacity followed an N-shaped trajectory. The mid-phase decline in state capacity is attributed to the weakening credibility of the ruler’s contract with elites. This decline aligns with the significant downturn of the Chinese state during the late Imperial period, followed by a resurgence in modern times as bureaucratization eventually reaches its full form. Furthermore, this model may have broader applicability to other historical civilizations.

No extended abstract or paper available

 Presented in Session 61. Historical Social Sciences and China (I): New Approaches to Studying Elite Politics