The Rise and Fall of Progressive Local Governments: Understanding Japan's Ambiguous Welfare Regime through Local Fiscal Politics

Ryotaro Takahashi, Keio University

Japan’s welfare regime has persistently resisted clear categorization within established typologies. Esping-Andersen described Japan as a conservative-liberal hybrid, while recent studies have proposed alternatives such as the developmental state model. However, ambiguity persists regarding Japan’s precise classification. This study explores the historical reasons for this ambiguity by examining the local fiscal politics of the 1970s, particularly focusing on the interactions between some progressive local governments (Kakushin Jichitai) and Japan's centralized fiscal system. During the late 1960s and the 1970s, progressive local governments posed a major political challenge to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Prominent governors such as Tokyo’s Ryokichi Minobe and Osaka’s Ryoichi Kuroda, supported by the opposition parties, adopted welfare-oriented policies emphasizing elderly healthcare and anti-pollution measures, thus contesting Japan’s conventional developmental state. These local initiatives influenced national policies, eventually compelling the central government towards welfare expansion similar to Western welfare states. However, these progressive governments faced significant fiscal constraints owing to Japan's centralized revenue structure, which severely limited their fiscal autonomy. Minobe attempted to strengthen local revenues by increasing corporate taxes, whereas Kuroda adopted conservative fiscal measures. The 1973 oil crisis further aggravated their fiscal conditions, sharply curtailing local revenues and undermining welfare policy sustainability. Minobe’s attempts to renegotiate central-local fiscal relations were rejected by the central government, which criticized the local spending as excessive. Conversely, Kuroda intentionally restrained welfare expenditures to maintain fiscal discipline. Consequently, progressive local governments diverged significantly in their means and ability to sustain welfare expansion, the ultimate fallout was a widespread policy rollback. By the late 1970s, most progressive governors, including Minobe and Kuroda, were replaced by conservatives, halting welfare state advancement. This study thus demonstrates that the structural tensions between progressive local initiatives and Japan’s centralized fiscal framework have contributed significantly to the ambiguity in defining Japan’s welfare regime typology.

No extended abstract or paper available

 Presented in Session 18. Fiscal Politics from Below: Local Responses to Central Governance