Dancing with Hands Tied: Why Elites Build New Political Parties in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes and How They Succeed

Tyler Rongxuan Chen, University of Michigan

Why do political elites defect from hegemonic parties in electoral authoritarian regimes? Why do some political parties from defections survive and some others fail? I argue that the key causal factor that has been overlooked is intraparty competition level. Since hegemonic parties inside electoral authoritarian regimes monopolize access to state power, factional competitions inside the parties are often fierce and consequential. The party elites, especially those of higher positions, that lose intraparty competitions will be forced to establish new political parties to prolong their political influence. If the new parties can bond with existing or articulate new social cleavages that can serve as their constituency, they will survive; otherwise, these parties will fade over time. I test my theory using a group of cases in Malaysia through process tracing and controlled comparisons. But I also illustrate this theory’s potential to travel beyond the Malaysia case.

No extended abstract or paper available

 Presented in Session 138. Elite Politics and Relational Power: Rethinking Political Change across Regimes