

## A Brief Review

Maoism emerged as a global revolutionary ideology in the 1960s and continued to shape the international order during and after the Cold War. How could we understand the rapid diffusion of Maoism during the Cold War? Why did Maoism appeal to a diverse range of followers—from dissent lefts and student protesters in developed countries to anti-colonial activists in the Global South, despite the dominance of the U.S. and the Soviet Union? Common explanations focus on the ideological flexibility of Maoism, the “non-whiteness” of Maoism and its appeal to minorities in the developed world (like Black Panther Party) and Third-World countries, the periphery positions in the world system, and China’s deliberate cooperation with heterodox groups as a diplomatic strategy. These structural and cultural explanations, however, leave theoretical and empirical issues on Maoism. First, the ideological positions of Maoism and its audiences as well as their positions and preferences are *a priori* in those explanations, say, they assume people of color tend to accept Maoism for their racial identity. Second, most explanations are *ad hoc* for certain cases, which makes them ungeneralizable to other cases. Many peripheral, underdeveloped, and agricultural states did not witness a strong Maoist movement, and the Chinese diplomatic policy was shifting all over the time, which supported the enemy of Maoist activists many times (like Nixon).

Using network data from *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* and other supplementary archives, I argue that the rise of global Maoism was attributed to its diffusion in a multilevel and multiplex network: at the local level, a moderate level of schism within communists in a given country provided the constituents of Maoism. Strong schism would face state repression because of the radicalization of communists, while weak schism would make a small faction of Maoists. At the global level, local communists' intellectual proximity to radical intellectual circles and organizational distance to International Communist Movement led by the Soviet Union facilitated a favorable external environment. Ties like student organizations, advisership from certain individuals like Du Bois, and pan-Asianist/Africanist movements allowed local communists to have more exposure to Maoism, while political aloofness to the Soviet Union and more “instituted” communist organizations prevented the Soviet interruption of the diffusion process. The case of Maoism shows how multiple networks *translate* structural factors in the process of global social movements, and how the anti-colonial fashion in Maoist ideology was *emerged*, not rooted in the ideology *a priori*, from its diffusion. In other words, the attribute of Maoism was the consequence, not cause, of its global diffusion.

## Structure of the Paper (ongoing sections italicized)

Introduction to Maoism: its prominence, and why it is a strange case  
Common explanations

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Review on theory: social movement diffusion and its challenge to structural explanations; new theories and studies from social network analysis

Review on empirical case: a brief QCA on Maoist movements in 70 states, which confirms the unconformity of existing theories

Introduction to data

*Social Network Analysis*

*Local Network: I am going to use network density, diameter, and blocking model to identify the size of each clique and set a threshold to determine what is a “moderate” schism. Then using the level of schism as variables to estimate its effect in regression analysis.*

*Global Network: I will code all important “Maoist” figures and their networks with other intellectuals, leaders, and activists as well as connections among communist parties to draw two networks. It’s still ongoing but I assume I will use centrality as the parameter for analysis.*

*A brief case illustration*

- *Cambodia: China actually supported its opponent, Norodom Sihanouk, before its rise. Leaders of Khmer Rouge were close to Paris intellectuals, especially Samir Amin, partly because its French colonial legacy. Moderately connected to the Chinese state and Vietnam, which ensured its independence.*

*Conclusion: Networks, ties, interpersonal and interorganizational relations in multiple domains translate the structural factor (color line, periphery, etc.) and construct the ideological factor.*